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Informality, Corruption, and Inequality  
 
1. Introduction 
The “informal sector”, which has also been referred to as the “shadow or underground 
economy” [Schneider and Enste (2000)], and “unofficial activity” [Friedman, et. al. 
(2000)], plays a significant role in developing economies. Adopting the conventional 
Wikipedia definition of the informal sector as “economic activity that is neither taxed 
nor monitored by a government, and is not included in that government’s Gross 
National Product (GNP), as opposed to a formal economy”, it is clear that the 
existence of this sector poses, in the words of Straub (2005, p. 299), “a major 
challenge to economic and social policies in developing countries”. The informal 
sector impedes economic progress on principally three counts: first, it is a significant 
source of revenue leaks for the government that deprives the economy of funds that 
could have been used for development; second, since its activities are hidden from 
public scrutiny, it is not subject to labour standards such as minimum wages, decent 
and non hazardous working conditions, child labour laws, etc; third, in denying access 
to official credit channels, firms operating informally are denied access to modern 
technology leading to loss of productivity and, additionally, are deprived of protection 
from extortion and other forms of corruption due to the unregistered nature of their 
businesses. Consequently, there have been attempts to measure the size of the 
informal economy [Friedman, et. al. (2000)] and examine some of the factors that 
explain the existence and size of the informal sector1.While, by nature of the concept 
of informality, all such measures must be tentative, the available evidence suggests 
that the size of the informal sector is quite significant. For example, according to 
information contained in “Measuring the Size of the Informal Sector” in the World 
bank website, http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/, the informal sector 
employment accounts for 10 % or more urban employment in several transition 
countries. Estimates presented in Schneider and Enste (2000) suggest that even in 
developed countries, such as those in Western Europe and the USA, the size of the 
shadow economy relative to GNP is upwards of 15 % in many cases with double digit 
growth rates in the past three decades.     
                                                 
1 Examples include Djankov, et. al. (2002),Straub (2005), Dabla-Norris, et. al. (2008), 
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Due to the wide appreciation of the threat that the informal sector poses to 
development, there has been renewed interest in the informal sector or shadow 
economy, its determinants and implications for overall economic performances.2 With 
the availability of good quality data sets , mostly involving survey data containing 
firms’ responses to questions on their formal and informal operations, analytical  
modeling have been substantiated by hard empirical evidence. The present exercise is 
in this recent tradition.  
 
This paper examines two aspects of the informal sector that have not featured much in 
the literature, namely, the interaction of the informal sector with corruption, and vice 
versa, and the role that rising income inequality plays in supporting and expanding the 
size of the informal sector. As attention increasingly turns to the reasons for 
informality, it is important from a policy viewpoint to examine if corruption and 
informality feed on each other. This paper provides analytical arguments that suggest 
that corruption and inequality provide possible explanations for the existence of the 
informal sector. An increase in these variables leads to an increase in the size of the 
informal sector. The paper provides support for the propositions with hard empirical 
evidence based on a large cross country survey data containing firms’ responses. 
While Straub (2005) stresses the role of lack of access to formal credit mechanisms in 
explaining the existence of the informal sector, Dabla-Norris, et. al. (2008) focus on 
poor quality legal framework and legal obstacles as possible explanations for the rise 
of the informal sector. Though Djankov et. al. (2002) suggest that “countries with 
heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies”, 
we are not aware of any previous studies that investigate the link between corruption 
and informality. 
 
Corruption entails social and economic costs to development that are similar to those 
of informality. The magnitude of corruption is also believed to be comparable to that 
of the informal sector. Consequently, the same concern that underlines the recent 
                                                 
2 See Straub (2005), Dabla-Norris et al (2008), Choi and Thum (2005), Johnson et al (2000 ), Friedman 
et al (2000), Schneider and Enste (2000) among others.  
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interest in the informal sector also explains the resurgence of work on corruption.3 It 
is worth pointing out that factors such as “the rise of the burden of taxes…declining 
tax morale” identified by Schneider and Enste (2000) or the lack of a quality legal 
system identified by Dabla-Norris, et. al. (2008) as possible explanations for the 
informal sector also figure prominently as likely explanations for corruption. 
However, to our knowledge, there has not been any serious attempt to examine the 
nature of interaction between informality and corruption. Yet, from a policy 
viewpoint, this is an important issue to investigate since if, as this paper shows, the 
interaction between the two is mutual, positive and significant , with informality and 
corruption feeding off one another, then an integrated strategy to combat both forms 
of illegality is likely to be effective. Such an attempt is the principal motivation of this 
study. The issue of increasing inequality possibly leading to rising informal sector is 
also significant in the present context since increasing inequality has also been 
identified as leading to increasing corruption. Incidentally, while Straub (2005) argues 
that lack of access to formal credit encourages firms to go informal, the inequality 
variable adds to this explanation since in a more unequal society individuals and firms 
at the lower end of the distribution find it harder to get access to formal credit and 
modern technology. 
Before we discuss the formal analytical model, the main arguments can be described 
as follows. Firm’s choice to be in the informal sector (or keeps part of its business in 
the informal sector) can be studied under two different but related approaches. One 
approach treats this as an enforcement problem not very different from the classical 
tax evasion problem (Rauch 1991, Dabla-Norris et al 2008). Operation in the formal 
sector entails certain fixed costs like cost of obtaining license (including extortion by 
issuing bureaucrats), taxes of various kinds and other costs of meeting various 
regulatory standards. By choosing to be in the informal sector a firm avoids these 
costs but runs the risk of apprehension and penalties.  Hence factors contributing to 
either the fixed costs (taxes and regulatory burden) or actual enforcement (rule of law, 
corruption) will affect the extent of informal activities. As mentioned earlier, 
corruption is a key determinant in our model but we argue that it is affected by the 
size of the informal sector.  
                                                 
3 See Mishra (2005) for a comprehensive survey and for some of the important contributions in the 
corruption literature. 
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The other approach entails looking at structural characteristics like market 
imperfections and unequal distribution of wealth and income to explain why it might 
be profitable to locate in the informal sector. Imperfect credit markets would lead to 
firm’s total investment being determined by available wealth. The existence of fixed 
operation costs in the formal sector would imply that only the very wealthy would 
find it profitable to be in the formal sector. An economy with very few wealthy 
potential entrepreneurs will exhibit a small formal sector. But a small formal sector 
does not necessarily lead to a large informal sector. Profitability in the informal sector 
also has to be sufficiently high relative to non-production activities. First, at low 
levels of development returns to non-production activities (subsistence sector or wage 
employment) are likely to be low. Second, firms in the informal sector enjoy higher 
profitability because of favorable demand conditions for their product. Informal sector 
is likely to be associated with lower quality products whose demand is sustained by 
unequal distribution of income amongst the consumers. It is difficult to test the actual 
mechanism but we do find strong evidence that greater inequality supports a larger 
informal sector.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model that 
is used to explain how corruption and informality are jointly determined. In Section 3 
the model is extended in different ways to study the impact of inequality. Given the 
complex nature of interaction between informality and inequality, we consider various 
channels though which inequality might affect the size of the informal sector. Section 
4 reports the empirical evidence that provides support to the propositions outlined in 
Section 2 and compares the determinants of informal sector and corruption. We end 
on the concluding note of Section 5.  
  
2. A Simple Model 
We consider a set of potential entrepreneurs of measure one. Each entrepreneur is 
endowed with asset/income A and the distribution of this asset is given by the 
distribution function G(A), 0≤A≤ A .4 An entrepreneur can make an investment of K 
and produce output RK. Production can take place either in the formal sector (F) or in 
                                                 
4 The corresponding density is denoted by g(A), the upper bound on A allows us to consider simple 
constant returns technology.  
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the informal sector (I). Formal sector production involves fixed non-production cost 
C. This cost has several components. It includes the costs of obtaining various 
licenses and permits to undertake production, costs of compliance with government 
stipulated rules and regulations, and a lump sum tax t.  As various authors have noted, 
it also includes the bribe payments (extortion) that the entrepreneur has to make 
before undertaking the project.  
However, by locating in the informal sector an entrepreneur can avoid incurring such 
costs. But entrepreneurs in this sector always run the risk being apprehended by an 
inspector. If apprehended the entrepreneur looses all its profit. It is possible to argue 
that productivity in the informal sector is likely to be low because producers do not 
have access to various publicly provided goods and services or benefits of protection 
from the legal system. We do not dispute this but we begin with the simpler 
formulation where an investment of K in the informal sector produces exactly same 
amount of output RK. This will be relaxed later in section 3.  
 
2.1 Credit Market 
We consider a simple variant of credit market imperfections where credit contracts are 
not enforced perfectly.5 Credit market is otherwise competitive where everybody 
takes the gross interest rate ρ as given. Suppose the entrepreneur borrows an amount B 
and the total investment is K. If a borrower defaults the bank can recover only a 
fraction τ of the total return RK, 0 ≤ τ ≤1. The borrower will default if the cost of 
default τRK is lower than the repayment obligation Bρ. To avoid such default, lender 
will choose B (for a project of size K) such that  
 B ≤ τRK/ρ                                                                                                        (1) 
We assume that all entrepreneurs have equal access to the same credit market. This is 
in contrast to Straub (2005) where entrepreneurs in the informal sector do not have 
access to the formal credit market, rather they rely on the informal credit market. 
However, we can introduce differential cost of capital or borrowing constraints 
without any problem.6  
                                                 
5 There are various ways in which credit market imperfections in the presence of wealth constraints can 
be modeled. The present version follows Matsuyama (2000).  
6We do not find strong empirical justification for such dual access. Note that output may not be 
declared by producers in the informal sector, but that does not mean output can not be verified ex post. 
This ex post verification is needed to enforce (however imperfectly) credit contracts. Secondly, 
formality and informality are only two ends of a spectrum where each firm hides output to some extent. 
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Consider an entrepreneur in the formal sector. Note that C has to be paid from own 
income and only (A-C) can be used to invest in the production process. To make a 
total investment of K, the entrepreneur needs to borrow (K-A+C). Using (1) it is clear 
that the maximum investment a formal sector entrepreneur with asset A can undertake 
will be given by 
 KF(A) = η(A-C)  where η = ρ/(ρ-τR)  >1, ρ > 0                                               (2) 
In our model, producers will in fact borrow and invest the maximum amount. 
Likewise, for the informal sector producer,  
 KI(A) = ηA where η = ρ/(ρ-τR)  >1                                                                 (3) 
Note that that the amount that a producer in the formal sector can borrow gets 
severely constrained because of C.  Condition (2) implies that anyone with A < C can 
never be in the formal sector. However, we are interested in examining why are there 
producers with A>C who might be in the informal sector. 
 
2.2 Informality 
A producer is inspected with probability θ by an inspector. A producer in the informal 
sector faces a fine of the entire net profit. However, the inspector is corruptible and 
can be bribed. Suppose the likelihood of the inspector being corrupt is q and the 
producer has to pay a fraction b of the profit as bribe. We are treating corruption as 
exogenous for this section only; both q and b will be derived explicitly in the next 
section.  Following the previous discussion and assumptions, payoffs (expected 
payoffs) to producers in the formal (VF) and informal sectors (VI)   can be easily 
derived. 
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Using (2) and (3), a potential entrepreneur will choose to be in the formal sector if and 
only if its assets/income A ≥ A* where A* is given by 
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Let V0 be the payoff to a potential entrepreneur who chooses not to enter production. 
We shall assume that V0 is independent of A and there exists A0 such that VI (A0) =V0.  
Hence all agents with A0≤ A<A* will choose to be the informal sector.  
It can be argued that reservation payoff A0 depends on the level of economic 
development. Then the informal sector will be larger at low levels of development. 
But this may not be so straightforward because at lower levels of development 
productivity parameter R is also likely to be lower.  Note that A* does not depend on 
R but A0 falls as R is raised.7 This suggests that as productivity rises without a change 
in costs C, rule of law θ and level of corruption q, we will see a rise in the informal 
sector. 8 Let F and I denote the sizes of formal and informal sector respectively. 
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It will be convenient to consider the relative size of the informal sector as S = I/(I+F). 
It is easy to verify that  
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Proposition 1: Suppose the level of corruption (q) is given and same for all 
producers. The relative size of the informal sector is positively related to the extent of 
non-production costs (C) in the formal sector and the level of corruption in the 
informal sector (q), and inversely related to the effectiveness of the rule of law (θ). 
While the formal sector may not be affected by the average productivity, informal 
sector is likely to be higher.  
 
2.3 Corruption 
To see how corruption interacts with informality we shall extend the basic model of 
the previous section. The regulator employs some (measure P) inspectors to inspect 
the producers and each inspector receives wage w. We assume that each inspector can 
detect upon inspection whether the producer has complied or not, and we shall also 
                                                 
7 In fact A* does not depend on credit market variables (d, ρ) also. This does not mean that credit 
market imperfections do not matter. This is partly due to the fact that we have taken total bribe 
payment to be proportional to the net output. If bribe payment is a constant b, then A* will depend on R 
and η.  But then a rise in R would lead to a rise in A*- suggesting a fall in the formal sector. 
Rxq
qb
q
CA
)1()1(
* −−−= θ  
8 Since we have taken productivity to be same in both sectors, we do not wish to make too much of this 
observation. But later we shall introduce different R for the two sectors.  
 8
assume that each inspector inspects only one firm. The inspector can (truthfully) 
report non-compliance by the informal sector producer or suppress this information in 
exchange for a bribe.9  But bribery gets exposed with some probability d and 
following exposure the corrupt inspector is fired. In addition to the loss of wage 
income, dismissal implies a personal cost m. This cost m is uniformly distributed over 
an interval [0, M]. We shall assume that this cost m is independent of total bribes 
received by the inspector.10  
Since all producers will have to be inspected, the probability that an informal sector 
producer will be apprehended is given by θ = P/( I+F). We shall take that θ is not a 
choice variable of the regulator. Hence P is adjusted to maintain this audit probability.  
The inspector will choose to report honestly if the following condition is satisfied. 
w ≥ (1-d)(y+w)+d(-m)                                                                                   (9) 
where y is the total bribe income received by the inspector. As is evident from the 
corruption literature, bribe will depend on several factors including the distribution of 
bargaining powers between inspector and the producer, the disagreement payoffs and 
the total benefit from collusion. In the previous section we had taken y = b(RK-(K-
A)ρ).11  We assume that the firm makes a bribe offer to the inspector after being 
apprehended. Note that the private cost m is known only to the inspector. Hence while 
making an offer the firm takes in to account the fact that a low bribe offer will be 
rejected with a higher probability. More specifically a firm chooses bribe offer by 
solving the following problem, 
ρδ
δ )()1)(( AKRKxwyyxMax −−=−−−  
where the second term is the probability that a bribe offer y will be accepted. 
Assuming an interior solution and solving the first order conditions we get 
M
wxxqwxxy δ
δδ
δ
δ
2
)1()(,
)1(22
)(* −−=−+=                                                  (10) 
                                                 
9 To keep things simple we do not consider the possibility of extortion where the inspector could extort 
from the formal sector firms by threatening to report. 
10 When an inspector is found to have taken bribe from some producer, the moral indignation suffered 
is same as discovery of bribery from several producers. In the absence of heterogeneity this cost does 
not play any significant role. See Bose and Echazu (2007) for an analysis of bribery in the informal 
sector with other types of agent heterogeneity.    
11 Various authors (See Mishra 2005 and references therein) approach bribe determination as the 
solution to a symmetric Nash bargaining problem. For example, it can be shown that the producer has 
to pay a bribe of RK/2 in the symmetric case with d=0. This can be thought of as a situation where the 
inspector makes a take it or leave it offer with probability ½. In the present context, since m is private 
information, alternating offer approach gets very complicated.  
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Since x essentially depends on A, this implies that an entrepreneur with higher A 
(hence higher K) will offer a higher bribe and has a greater chance of succeeding in 
bribing the inspector. The smaller and less wealthy firms will not be able to bribe their 
way out so easily. Once we solve for the bribe, we can rework the expected payoff in 
the informal sector. 
)(
R
AR)AK(RKx
M)(
}wx){(x)(VI
δδρ
ρρ
δδ
δδθθ
−−=−−=
−
−−+−=
1
14
11
2
                                                       (11) 
This implies that for a given w and m, an inspector is more likely to be honest when 
facing a producer with low K. Each firm will be inspected with the same probability θ, 
but the probability of a corrupt deal between the firm and the inspector will depend on 
the firm’s output RK. Informal sector producers have to be profitable enough for 
inspectors to actually participate in bribery 
Like before, an entrepreneur with VI > VF, VI ≥ V0 will choose to be in the informal 
sector, where VI and VF are given by (11) and (4). Consider the marginal entrepreneur 
(A*) who is just indifferent between being in the formal or informal sector. Like 
before (see (5)) A* > C and it is reasonable to assume that A* exists (A* < A ) in the 
present case. Consider the other marginal entrepreneur (A0) who is indifferent 
between staying in the informal sector and staying out of the production sector. Since 
the probability of a corrupt deal is increasing in A and VI crucially depends on 
successful corrupt deals, A0 is associated with the threshold level of corruption which 
makes operation in the informal sector viable.  
Figure 1 below plots VF and VI.  The intersection of these two gives us A*. As shown 
in the Figure 1 below, the position of A0 in relation to C (to the left or right) depends 
on the extent of corruption. Note that entrepreneurs lying to the left of C will not be in 
the formal sector, irrespective of the corruption possibilities. There are entrepreneurs 
(C<A<A*) who could have chosen to be in the formal sector but prefer to be in the 
informal sector. A fall in θ or/and an increase in corruption possibilities would shift VI 
upwards (shown by the dotted curve) leading to greater informal sector. From (11) it 
is clear that corruption possibilities are determined by wage rate w and the distribution 
of private cost m. 
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Obviously, for higher values of w, there will be less scope for corruption.12 However, 
w can not be set arbitrarily. As discussed earlier, the total cost C also includes a tax 
component t.  Since we have assumed that monitoring intensity θ is given, w is 
determined by the following condition. 13 
tFIFwwP =+= )(θ                                                                                    (12) 
A higher I (when the formal sector is unchanged) necessitates employment of more 
inspectors and hence a lowering of w. Likewise a higher informal sector at the cost of 
formal sector (so that I + F is unchanged) will lead to a lower wage.14 A lower w in 
turn would mean a higher q for each level of A. We can describe this implicit 
relationship as q(S) with S
q ∂∂  > 0. To capture the extent of corruption, it will be 
convenient to refer to the average corruption level given by the following. 
∫=
*
0
)()(1ˆ
A
A
dAAgAq
I
q                                                                                      (13) 
 
                                                 
12 One can derive efficiency wage levels which will deter corruption. We have chosen the efficiency 
wage approach to corruption control. But corruption could be tackled through other means also. For 
example, the inspectors could receive rewards (as some fraction of producer’s profit) for reporting. See 
Besley and McLaren (1990), Mookherjee and Png (1995) for different approaches.  
13 We have not included revenue collected from informal sector in this budget constraint. Inclusion of 
this revenue tilts the model in favor of a higher wage, since higher wage can induce greater honesty and 
hence the regulator is likely to collect penalties with greater probability. However, the basic insight that 
a smaller formal sector or/and a larger informal sector leads to a reduction in the inspector’s wage 
carries through.    
14 It can be shown that we can not have a case where I rises but (I+F) falls significantly to raise w. 
A 
V
A
VI 
VF 
A* C 
E
A0 
Figure 1 
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2.4 Joint determination 
 As discussed earlier, an entrepreneur’s payoff from being in the informal sector will 
depend on the probability that the entrepreneur is able to bribe the inspector. As the 
level of corruption rises (probability of meeting a corrupt inspector rises), the 
expected payoff from being in the informal sector is higher and as a consequence A* 
is also higher.  
Figure 2 plots S(q) and q(S) showing the equilibrium levels of informality and 
corruption (point E).  Recall that S refers to the relative size of the informal sector. To 
guarantee the existence of an interior equilibrium point, we assume that q(1) <1 and 
S(1) < 1. The first inequality is always going to be satisfied for higher values of M. 
This is similar to the assumption made in various models of corruption where a 
certain (however small) fraction of the population is always honest. Likewise, the 
second inequality will follow from the fact bribery is not costless. The producer in the 
informal sector will escape the stipulated punishment with certainty, but will 
nonetheless pay a substantial bribe to do so. Additionally, S(0) > 0 and q(0) = 0.   
 
Figure 2 
Following a rise in C the relative size of informal sector is higher even when the level 
of corruption is same. This leads to a shift in the S(q) (shown by the dotted line) 
resulting in higher informality and corruption.15  Similarly, suppose anti-corruption 
                                                 
15 While authors have linked C with extortion and bribery in the formal sector (i.e. Choi and Thum 
2005), this result shows that corruption in the informal sector is also affected by changes in C. These 
complementarities between different forms of corruption have not been modeled.  
q 
S
1 
S(q) 
q(S) 
q* 
S* E
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efforts are more effective (δ is higher) or the private cost of punishment goes up. This 
will lead to a shift in q(S) (shown by the dotted line) resulting in a fall in the levels of 
corruption and informality. In some other instances both these curves will shift. 
Suppose enforcement efforts are raised by raising θ. From proposition 1 we know that 
this will lead to a fall in the size of informal sector. But once we allow for level of 
corruption to be endogenously determined, the result is not unambiguous. A rise in θ 
will imply a smaller w and consequently more corruptibility. Hence the deterrence 
effects of higher inspection get negated by a rise in corruption. The net effect will 
depend on the relative shifts in S(q) and q(S).  
Proposition 2: Let, q(I), I(q) < 1 and I(0)>q(0). Informality and corruption are jointly 
determined.  Levels of informality and corruption will be higher following a rise in 
cost of entering the formal sector C or/and deterioration in anti-corruption efforts (δ). 
However, a rise in enforcement effort without corresponding rise in anti-corruption 
efforts will not have the desired affect on the size of the informal sector.  
 
3. Inequality  
How does the distribution of A affect the inspector’s and the entrepreneur’s choice? 
Recent empirical exercises (Rosser et.al. 2000, Chong and Gradstein 2007) have 
noted a negative link between inequality (as measured by Gini coefficient of income) 
and the size of informal sector. Similarly, the level of perceived corruption in an 
economy has also been shown to be negatively related to income inequality (You and 
Khagram 2005 Gupta et al 2000).16 Our analytical construct suggests that inequality is 
likely to affect levels of both informality and corruption.  
But the effect of changes in inequality is not so straight forward. Using figure 1 we 
can get an idea of how changes in inequality will affect the size of the informal 
sector.17 Let G/ denote the distribution of A following a redistribution of 
assets/income. Following the definition of I, it would follow that the informal sector 
will also go up if G/(A*)> G(A*). However, informal sector is likely to be unchanged 
if G/(A0)> G(A0) and G/ and G coincide over the interval [A0 A*]. Clearly inequality 
has increased, number of potential entrepreneurs with small A has increased but they 
                                                 
16 While the negative link is not debated, the causation can run either way. A more unequal society 
leads to more corruption (see Dutta and Mishra (2005) for a theoretical contribution). Likewise, a 
corrupt society can worsen inequality by diverting productive resources to the rich. 
17 It must be noted that Straub (2005) will also lead to similar conclusion regarding effect of inequality. 
This highlights the fact that credit market imperfections are important but not the differential access.  
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are so poor that it they don’t enter the informal sector.  In such case, inequality will 
have no effect on informality. Of course one can consider specific distributions of A 
and then show that a rise in inequality will raise informality. 
Suppose asset A is distributed according to Pareto distribution.18 This distribution 
captures the fact that in many developing countries, a very small fraction of the 
population own substantial wealth and there is concentration of individuals at the 
lower end.  Since we are considering a population of potential entrepreneurs, it is 
expected that most will have asset in excess of certain absolute minimum Am. We 
denote the Pareto index as α. Then the cumulative distribution function of A is given 
by mm AAA
AAG >≥−= ,1,)(1)( αα . Using (7) it can be shown that  
0,)(1 *
0 <∂
∂−= α
α S
A
AS                                                                           (14) 
For the Pareto distribution, the Gini coefficient of inequality ν can be shown to be 
11,
12
1 ==−= αναν if                                                        (15) 
For a fixed Am, this is a single parameter distribution and a rise in ν (worsening 
inequality) can be interpreted as a fall in α. From this it is clear that for higher values 
of ν, S will also be higher for the same level of corruption. This means the S(q) curve 
will shift upwards (like the dotted line in Figure 2). As a result, both corruption and 
informality rise in equilibrium. 
Proposition 3: A rise in inequality (of assets) as measured by the Gini coefficient will 
lead to a rise in the size of the informal sector and the level of corruption. 
 
As discussed earlier, some studies (i.e Dabla-Norris et.al. 2008) have noted that the 
informal sector is populated by less productive firms. Firms in the informal sector do 
not have access to benefits associated with various public goods and secure property 
rights.19 However, our earlier discussions suggest that profitability in the informal 
sector can not be too low. What prevents informal sector profitability from being 
driven down? To answer this we need to consider the product market in the analysis. 
Firms in the formal and informal sectors receive the profits/returns R specified in 
                                                 
18 However, it has to be a truncated distribution, since A has to be bounded above. We can not have 
infinitely large A as it would imply infinite K too. So all results presented in the text are 
approximations only.  
19 It is clear that causality runs both ways. A firm is less productive because it is located in the informal 
sector. The reverse is also possible, only less productive firm prefer to join the informal sector.  
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earlier sections through some form of competition. What determines the level of R, 
especially in the informal sector? We consider two different ways in which inequality 
and market forces affect R. 
First, informal sector returns depend on the composition of firms operating in the 
formal sector. If the formal sector consists of highly productive efficient firms, one 
expects informal sector returns to be lower. We argue that inequality limits the entry 
of productive but wealth constrained firms in the formal sector. As a result, informal 
sector enjoys higher returns.  
Second, informal sector returns are likely to be likely to be determined by the demand 
composition. It is reasonable to assume that there will be some amount of product 
differentiation between the formal and informal sector firms. Suppose formal sector 
produces higher quality good than the informal sector.  We do not have data on 
product characteristics of firms in these two sectors but this assumption seems quite 
plausible. 20 In such a scenario income distribution of the consumers will determine 
the demand for informal sector goods.21 Greater inequality means bigger demand and 
profitability for the informal sector.   
 
3.1 Efficiency 
Consider the basic model of Section 2 with the following differences. Potential 
entrepreneurs can be of two types of entrepreneurial ability; high (h) and low (l). Let 
H and L denote the measures of these two types of potential entrepreneurs.  We also 
assume that credit market is non-existent. Productivity of the h-type entrepreneur in 
the formal sector is given by Rh. Productivity of the l-types in the formal sector and 
productivity of both types in the informal sector is simply RI, Rh < RI. As discussed 
earlier RI depends on the number of h-type entrepreneurs in the formal sector.  In the 
informal sector, we consider the simpler version of section 2.2 where the probability 
of meeting a corrupt inspector is same for all firms and is fixed at q. Assuming θ = 1, 
we can derive the VF and VI as follows. 
)(,..),( CARVARbqVCARV IFlIIhFh −==−=                                               (16) 
                                                 
20 A small roadside garage running an informal business is likely to provide lower quality services than 
the organized large garages.   
21 Note that these two routes refer to inequality of different sets of agents. The first argument relies on 
the distribution of income or wealth amongst producers, while the second uses the distribution of 
income amongst consumers to derive demand functions. Empirically, the inequality measure refers to 
the overall economy wide distribution. 
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The h-type entrepreneurs with A≥ A*h will choose to be in the formal sector where 
Ih
h
h RbqR
CRA
..
*
−=                                                                                           (17) 
We can derive a similar condition for the l-type entrepreneurs. The number of h-type 
formal sector entrepreneurs will be given by 
∫= A
A
h
h
dAAgHF
*
)(                                                                                          (18) 
Recall that RI= R(Fh ) and R/ < 0. Consider a situation where G(A*h ) is small. This 
suggests that Fh is large leading to a low RI. But a lower RI means that A*h is also 
lower and more h-type entrepreneurs would join the formal sector. The informal 
sector will be populated by some h-type (A< A*h ) and  more l-types with A < C/(1-
qb). However, a lower RI implies that those with lower A will choose to be outside the 
production sector.  In the limiting case, as RI →0, Fh reaches its maximum (A*h→ C).  
If the number of wealth-constrained entrepreneurs rises following a redistribution of 
assets, the number of h-type entrepreneurs entering the formal sector shrinks 
significantly. As Fh falls initially due to redistribution, RI increases leading to further 
expansion of the informal sector and fall in Fh. The figure below shows how the 
informal sector grows following a change in distribution of A. The solid and dashed VI 
lines show the payoff to being in the informal sector before and after the 
redistribution.  The initial redistribution might have been small but the resultant effect 
on the informal sector is substantial.  
 
A 
V
A
VI 
VF 
A* C A* 
VI 
Figure 3 
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3.2 Product Differentiation 
Suppose we have N industries, each industry has two potential firms (one in the 
formal sector (F) and the other in the informal sector (I)) which are producing goods 
that are close substitutes. 22 These two firms compete by choosing prices pF and pI. On 
the demand side consumers have identical tastes for this good but have different 
income Y.  Let Y(j) be the income of consumer j, where j is distributed uniformly over 
[0 1] and  Y(j) = b + zj, z > 0.23 Consumers purchase either one unit of this good (F or 
I) or none. Utilities are given by 
0
00 ))(.(),)(.()),(.(
uuu
ptYuUptYuUtYuU
IF
IIIFFF
>>
−=−==
                             (19) 
Firms F and I compete in the market by choosing prices pF and pI. Let RF, RI denote 
the corresponding profit functions. We shall be looking at an equilibrium price pair 
(pF*, pI*) such that  
)p,p(R)p,p(R),p,p(R)p,p(R I
*
FI
*
I
*
FI
*
IFF
*
I
*
FF ≥≥                               (20) 
To see how distribution of income matters, let us consider specific example with uF= 
20, uI=10 and u0=5.  Consumer j is indifferent between buying F and I if and only if  
 
                             (21) 
 
Hence all consumer with income greater than Y(j) will purchase from firm F. 
Likewise, consumer i is indifferent between buying the low quality I and not buying if 
and only if 
                                                (22) 
Using this we can write down the demand functions facing the two firms 
z
bpp
z
)(Y)f(Yd
z
ppzb
z
)f(Y)(Yd
IF
I
IF
F
−−=−=
+−+=−=
20
21
                                                      (23)24 
                                                 
22 It is essentially a slight variation of price competition model studied by Gabszewicz and Thisse 
(1979) and several others in later years. It shows that high income inequality is necessary for the 
informal sector firm to have a positive market share. 
23 It can be verified that for this distribution the mean income μ and standard deviation σ are given by  
  2
zb +=μ ,  
32
z=σ                                                                             
24 This implies that all the consumers are being served and Y(i)<Y(0), the lowest income is greater than 
the income of the consumer indifferent between purchasing I and not purchasing.  We can have other 
cases as well. The demand functions will be piece-wise linear. We have considered just one linear 
IFIF ppjYorpjYpjY −=−=− 2)())((10))((20
II p)i(Yor)i(Y)p)i(Y( 21510 ==−
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The corresponding profits are given by 
FFFF d)cp(R −=  and IIII d)cp(R −=                                              (24) 
 
Taking the first order conditions and solving the two reaction functions, it can be 
shown that there is an equilibrium where 
z
ccbzR FII 3
)}2(){( 2* −−−=                                                                         (25) 
It can be verified that this indeed is the unique equilibrium over the relevant range of 
parameters. This equilibrium is feasible if and only if 
FI ccbz −>−                                                                                              (26) 
From the mean and standard deviation of Y(j) (see footnote 23) it follows that income 
disparities captured by σ has to be high enough for the above condition (26) to hold. 
Then condition (26) can be rewritten as  
)(
33 FI
cccc −=+≥ μσ                                                                                     (27) 
Basically, without sufficient income disparity it is not possible to generate demand for 
the low quality product, the informal sector firm in the present case.  Suppose 
different industries have differing cost gap c. Then as inequality rises, it is possible 
more and more industries to have viable informal sector firm. For low levels of 
income disparity, we can have only F type firms in most industries and informal 
sector will be small.25 Hence the product market considerations imply a negative link 
between informality and inequality. The discussions of the previous two subsections 
can be summarized as follows. 
Proposition 4: Higher inequality helps to boost returns to production in the informal 
sector (i) by preventing wealth-constrained but efficient firms from entering 
production and (ii) by generating greater consumer demand for low quality informal 
sector products. Consequently, greater inequality will lead to a rise in informality and 
corruption.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
segment for each, this would require us to verify that the equilibrium prices are such that demands lie 
in these segments. 
25 It is possible to demonstrate this formally but the analytics seem to take us beyond the scope of this 
paper.  
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4. Data and Empirical Analysis. 
The World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) which provided the data set used in this 
study collect information (from the firm level surveys) about a host of questions that 
include the business environment, how it is perceived by individual firms, how it is 
perceived by individual firms, how it changes over time, and about the various 
constraints on firm performance and growth. It provides the world's most 
comprehensive company-level data in emerging markets and developing economies26. 
The Appendix table A1 lists the variables from this data set that we have used in this 
study. The variables that are worth special mention in the present context are Informal 
sales (as % age of total sales) and Bribe demand which is a dummy that takes the 
value 1 if the firm has been asked to pay a bribe and 0, otherwise.  The data set, one of 
the largest of its kind, is a cross country data set covering a range of developing and 
developed countries at various stages of development. While the WBES data provides 
information on the characteristics and attitudes of the individual firms surveyed, we 
supplemented this information by country level indicators obtained from a variety of 
sources that have been listed in the second half of Appendix table A1. These include 
the macro corruption perception and corruption risk indicators, Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) and   International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), respectively, which have 
been widely used in recent studies27. In our empirical work, we arranged the CPI and 
ICRG variables such that higher values denote increased corruption perception and 
corruption risk. It is important to note that while the variable, Bribe demand, is a firm 
level characteristic that contains information on whether a firm has been asked for a 
bribe or not, this is distinct from the country level corruption indicators, CPI and 
ICRG, which measure the overall climate of corruption in the country. The 
estimations reported below were based on a pooling of the WBES data sets over the 
period, 2002-2006. Unlike the study by Dabla-Norris et. al. (2008) , which also used 
the WBES data covering around 40 countries but for only a single year, the present 
study considered the same countries but pooled over multiple years, thus, allowing us 
to record the direction of change in informal shares over time after controlling for its 
principal determinants. The list of countries by years and showing the number of 
                                                 
26 Further details are available from the World Bank website, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ . See 
also Batra et al. (2003) for description of the data and some of its principal features. 
27 See the following websites on details of these perception indictors: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corruption_Perceptions_Index  ; 
http://www.adbi.org/3rdpartycdrom/2004/12/01/1359.international.country.risk/ 
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firms interviewed in each country is presented in Appendix table A2. Starting from a 
total of 27,086 observations ,as recorded in Appendix Table A2, we lost observations 
with the inclusion of the various determinants dropping down to 17606 observations 
which dropped further to 10,883 observations with the inclusion of additional country 
level characteristics.    
Tables 1a and 1b presents the OLS and IV estimates of the regression of informal 
sales ( as % age of total sales) on a  variety of firm characteristics and country level 
indicators listed in Appendix table A1.The IV estimation was based on the treatment 
of the corruption perception indicator ,icrg, for possible endogeneity. Tables 1a and 
1b differ because while the former (table 1a)  includes the bribe demand on the 
individual firm as a determinant of that firm’s informal sales, the latter (table1b) 
excludes this variable  The tables also present the robust standard errors and the p 
values showing the significance of the estimates. The estimates are mostly well 
determined.Table1a and 1b provide strong and robust support to the proposition on a 
positive association between corruption perception and informal sales. In other words, 
firms that operate in countries that are perceived to be at higher risk from corruption 
report, ceteris paribus, a higher share of its sales as informal sales. It is worth noting 
that this result is robust to the instrumentation of corruption perception by freedom of 
press and CO2 emissions. The positive, large and statistically significant estimate of 
the coefficient of the bribe demand variable in Table 1a suggests that a firm that has 
been asked to pay a bribe will increase its undeclared sales as a proportion of its total 
sales quite substantially. Income inequality has a strong and positive effect on 
informal sales. Consistent with the proposition28 derived earlier, increasing inequality 
leads to a large increase in the size of the informal sector. Another variable with a 
positive effect on informal sales and with some policy significance is nonperforming 
loans (npl). This result suggests that in a deteriorating credit environment caused by 
large default of loans due to their non performance the informal sector will increase 
requiring early policy intervention. The qualitative results are generally robust 
between the OLS and the IV estimates, i.e. with respect to the sign and significance of 
the estimates, though the magnitude often changes .This is in line with the bias in the 
OLS estimates from the treatment of the corruption perception variable (icrg) as an 
                                                 
28 Strictly speaking, the proposition relates to wealth inequality but, given the availability of data on 
wealth inequality for only a limited number of countries, we are using income inequality as a proxy for 
wealth inequality. 
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exogenous determinant. These tables also provide evidence on the validity of the 
instruments used. 
Other results from table 1a, 1b include the feature that a firm’s perception of the 
country’s legal system is a significant determinant of its decision on informal 
operations. Increased confidence in the country’s justice system (conf_justice) will 
encourage a firm to reduce informality and increase the share of formal sales. A firm 
that considers the functioning of the country’s judiciary as not conducive to its 
business operations (BClegalsyst) or, alternatively, views corruption as a business 
impediment (BCcorrupt) will increase the share of its total sales that it chooses not to 
declare. This is also true of firms that see labour regulations (BClabregu) as a 
constraint on its business operations. Consistent with these results and that of Dabla-
Norris, et. al. (2008), the large and highly significant coefficient estimate of the rule 
of law variable (ROL) suggests that firms operating in countries with superior quality 
legal systems will declare a larger share of their sales or, alternatively, improved legal 
systems will reduce informality. In other words, measures aimed at strengthening 
legal institutions, stricter enforcement of justice and increased confidence in the 
country’s judiciary are some of the most effective means of safeguarding the formal 
sector and preventing informality. Foreign owned firms are much less likely to go 
informal, but higher income firms and those in the export business will have a higher 
informality. The more literate a country, the higher is the size of the informal sector. 
Note however that this paradoxical result could be due to the treatment of bribe 
demand as an exogenous determinant of informal sales. As the following tables show, 
bribe demand is significantly and negatively affected by the literacy rates. The overall 
message from tables 1a and 1b is one of robustness of the qualitative picture on the 
effects of the principal variables of interest on informal share of sales to the treatment 
of the macro level corruption variable (icrg) as an exogenous or endogenous 
determinant in the econometric specification. The evidence contained in Tables 1(a) 
and 1(b) provide strong empirical support to the propositions in Sections 2 and 3. 
The results presented in Table 1a establish a positive correlation between bribe 
demand and informality and, in particular, suggest that firms that are asked to pay 
bribes will declare a lower share of their sales and increase informality. However, this 
relationship can go the other way as well since firms that go informal are more likely 
to receive bribe demands. To allow for this joint dependence, and examine robustness 
of the results to the possible endogeneity of the bribe demand variable, we performed 
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joint estimation of informal sales and bribe demand consistent with the discussion on 
their joint determination in Section 2.4. The results are presented in Table 2 which 
allows comparison of the effects of the various determinants of the two forms of 
illegality. Such a comparison suggests that the direction of the effect of the firm level 
characteristics and the macro indicators on informal sales and bribe demands is the 
same in most cases, but the magnitude of such effects is generally much larger for 
informal sales. The principal result of Table 1a, namely, the positive impact of bribe 
demand on informality is not only robust but the effect is actually stronger in Table 2 
which allows for two way feedback between the two. Table 2 confirms the reverse 
causation with informal sales having a positive and significant effect on bribe 
demands though the effect is much weaker. Increasing confidence in the country’s 
judicial system acts a brake on both forms of illegality extending the earlier result in 
Table 1 from informality to corruption. The earlier result that rising inequality 
increases informality is also robust between the two tables. It is also worth noting that 
while inequality has a large, positive and significant effect on informal sales, 
consistent with our earlier discussion, inequality has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on bribe demand, though the effect is much weaker. The rule of law 
variable impacts negatively on the corruption variable and this is passed on to 
informality through the positive association between corruption and informality. The 
policy implication is clear- an integrated approach to reducing both informality and 
corruption rests on a strengthening of legal institutions and measures to increase 
confidence in the country’s judiciary. An interesting point of difference between the 
two forms of illegality is that, after controlling for the respondents’ characteristics and 
country differences, while there has an increase in informality there has been a decline 
in business corruption.    
 
Table 2 suffers from the limitation that while the joint estimations consider the effect 
of micro level business corruption in the form of the WBES variable, bribe demands, 
on informal sales, it does not control for the corruption perception of the country at 
the macro level. To do so, we repeated the joint estimation with the corruption 
perception variables, ICRG and CPI, introduced as additional regressors, on the right 
hand size of the informal sales and corruption equations, respectively. The results are 
reported in Table 3.The positive association between corruption and informal sales 
manifests itself through the large and statistically significant impact of icrg on 
 22
informal sales. In other words, and consistent with tables 1a,1b,firms operating in 
countries with higher perceived risk of corruption are likely to experience greater 
informality.  Note , however, that on the introduction of the country wide indicator, 
icrg, the effect of the firm level bribe demand variable in the informal sales equation 
now weakens to statistical insignificance. This has the policy message that, in 
countries which are not regarded as being at high risk from corruption, bribe demands 
on the individual firms do not have any impact on the firm’s decision on informality. 
It is the overall corruption perception of a country that matters in driving informality, 
not so much the bribe demands made to the individual firms. In contrast, controlling 
for macro level corruption as measured by the corruption perception indicator (cpi) 
and the other determinants, increased informality does lead to significantly higher 
bribe demands on the firms. Most of the principal results on informality , for example, 
rising inequality increases informality, increased confidence in the country’s judiciary 
and an improvement in the credit situation brought about by a reduction in non 
performing bank loans reduces informality, is seen from Tables 1 and 3 to be robust 
between the single equation and the simultaneous equation estimates. Note from 
Table 3 that rising inequality as measured by the Gini leads to an increase in both 
informal sales and bribe demands as stated in our Proposition, but the effect on the 
latter is much weaker. Increasing literacy rates and improvements in the human 
development index lead to lower bribe demand in the country. Table 3 reports that, 
after controlling for a host of firm level characteristics and country indicators, there 
has been a large increase in informality in contrast to a small decline in bribe demand. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We have looked at the determinants of the size of the informal sector in developing 
countries. Large informal sectors are predominant in developing countries. Corruption 
is also pervasive in many of these countries. This is not a simple coincidence. The 
paper proposes an analytical model where corruption and informality are closely 
linked. In fact corruption and informality are jointly determined by a common set of 
variables. Our empirical exercises using firm level data support this approach.   
While we do not dispute several earlier observations that higher tax rates in the formal 
sector and inefficient regulations drive firms to the informal sectors, these 
observations fail to explain why firms in the informal sector  find it viable and in 
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many cases profitable to operate.  Corruption in the informal sector allows the 
informal sector firms to enjoy greater protection from enforcement and consequently 
higher profits.  Corruptible inspectors, in turn, thrive when there is a large informal 
sector. For a fixed size of formal sector, a larger informal sector implies poorer 
enforcement effort and lower efficiency wages for the inspectors. 
Corruption and informality complement each other and are jointly determined by 
several firm level as well as economy level variables like levels of development, 
literacy levels. Our key contribution lies in exploring the link between informality and 
inequality. Our theoretical model as well empirical exercises focus on wealth/income 
inequality as a key determinant. High degree of inequality leads to bigger informal 
sector. We offer several plausible channels through inequality can impact the size of 
the informal sector.  
There are three different ways in which inequality can affect informality and 
corruption. The first one is the most obvious and direct route where greater wealth 
inequality in the sense of large number wealth constrained individuals can lead to 
larger informal sector. Formal sector is normally associated with larger fixed costs 
and these wealth constrained individuals are forced to join the informal sector in the 
absence of well functioning credit markets.  The other two are less obvious. We argue 
that greater inequality limits the entry of productive but wealth constrained firms in 
the formal sector. As a result, informal sector enjoys higher returns. Third, informal 
sector returns are likely to high due to a strong demand for informal sector goods 
emanating from distributional issues.  Greater inequality in income distribution of the 
consumers will mean bigger demand and profitability for the informal sector.  The 
empirical exercises show that this relation between informality and inequality is 
indeed quite robust. 
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Table 1a: OLS and IV Estimates of Informal Salesa (with the bribe demand 
variable included) 
Variablesb Coefficientc 
Robust 
SE P>|t| Variablesb Coefficientc Robust SE P>|t| 
icrg 2.55* 0.29 0.000 icrg_IVd 5.99* 0.61 0.000 
Bribe demand 1.79* 0.39 0.000 Bribe demand 2.08* 0.43 0.000 
size -1.70* 0.26 0.000 size -1.71* 0.27 0.000 
firmage -0.07* 0.01 0.000 firmage -0.06* 0.01 0.000 
conf_justice -0.80* 0.14 0.000 conf_justice -0.89* 0.13 0.000 
DEffGovt 1.30 1.00 0.194 DEffGovt 0.41 0.76 0.590 
BClegalsyst 0.64* 0.22 0.004 BClegalsyst 0.69* 0.20 0.000 
BCanticomp 1.21* 0.18 0.000 BCanticomp 1.15* 0.17 0.000 
BCcrime -1.41* 0.21 0.000 BCcrime -1.28* 0.20 0.000 
BCcorrupt 1.88* 0.23 0.000 BCcorrupt 1.59* 0.21 0.000 
BCinstable 1.04* 0.21 0.000 BCinstable 1.05* 0.19 0.000 
BCpolicy -1.03* 0.23 0.000 BCpolicy -1.20* 0.20 0.000 
BClic 0.40** 0.20 0.042 BClic 0.34*** 0.18 0.062 
BClabregu 0.75* 0.20 0.000 BClabregu 0.67* 0.19 0.000 
income 1.35* 0.40 0.001 income 0.81*** 0.43 0.058 
Dexport 0.60 0.49 0.225 Dexport 1.03** 0.48 0.032 
Dforeign -4.35* 0.55 0.000 Dforeign -4.23* 0.59 0.000 
year 0.30*** 0.18 0.096 year 0.45** 0.19 0.019 
npl 0.15* 0.04 0.001 npl 0.22* 0.05 0.000 
gini 0.17* 0.03 0.000 gini 0.10* 0.04 0.007 
lgnp -0.31 0.75 0.683 lgnp -1.97** 0.78 0.011 
rol -6.31* 0.50 0.000 rol -7.68* 0.61 0.000 
literacy 0.51* 0.05 0.000 literacy 0.49* 0.04 0.000 
constant -583.65 367.23 0.112 constant -867.58** 390.11 0.026 
Number of 
Obs.   17662 
Number of 
Obs. 
  
17606 
F(23, 17638)   140.99 F(23, 17582)   133.96 
Prob>F   0.000* Prob>F   0.000* 
R-squared   0.148 
Anderson 
stats: χ2 (2) 4353.198 
 
0.000* 
Root MSE   23.753 
Sargan stats: 
χ2 (1) 0.22 
 
0.6387* 
a. Informal Sales is measured as a proportion of total sales. b. See Appendix Table A1 for meaning of the variable 
names. c. *, ** and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. d. icrg_IV implies that icrg is 
instrumented by Freedom of Press and CO2 emission. 
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Table 1b: OLS and IV Estimates of Informal Salesa [with the bribe demand 
variable excluded] 
Variablesb Coefficientc 
Robust 
SE P>|t| Variablesb Coefficientc Robust SE P>|t| 
icrg 2.47* 0.29 0.000 icrg_IVd 5.73* 0.61 0.000 
size -1.74* 0.27 0.000 size -1.75* 0.27 0.000 
firmage -0.07* 0.01 0.000 firmage -0.07* 0.01 0.000 
conf_justice -0.84* 0.14 0.000 conf_justice -0.93* 0.13 0.000 
DEffGovt 1.19 1.00 0.234 DEffGovt 0.32 0.76 0.676 
BClegalsyst 0.63* 0.22 0.005 BClegalsyst 0.68* 0.20 0.001 
BCanticomp 1.24* 0.18 0.000 BCanticomp 1.17* 0.17 0.000 
BCcrime -1.43* 0.21 0.000 BCcrime -1.30* 0.20 0.000 
BCcorrupt 1.95* 0.23 0.000 BCcorrupt 1.69* 0.20 0.000 
BCinstable 1.03* 0.21 0.000 BCinstable 1.03* 0.19 0.000 
BCpolicy -1.03* 0.23 0.000 BCpolicy -1.19* 0.20 0.000 
BClic 0.46** 0.20 0.019 BClic 0.41** 0.18 0.024 
BClabregu 0.77* 0.20 0.000 BClabregu 0.70* 0.19 0.000 
income 1.40* 0.40 0.000 income 0.90** 0.43 0.037 
Dexport 0.59 0.49 0.231 Dexport 1.00** 0.48 0.038 
Dforeign -4.29* 0.55 0.000 Dforeign -4.17* 0.59 0.000 
year 0.24 0.18 0.195 year 0.37*** 0.20 0.057 
npl 0.14* 0.05 0.002 npl 0.21* 0.05 0.000 
gini 0.15* 0.03 0.000 gini 0.07** 0.04 0.038 
lgnp -0.29 0.75 0.702 lgnp -1.87** 0.78 0.017 
rol -6.53* 0.50 0.000 rol -7.87* 0.61 0.000 
literacy 0.48* 0.05 0.000 literacy 0.47* 0.04 0.000 
constant -448.48 369.48 0.225 constant -697.25*** 391.42 0.075 
Number of 
Obs.   17662 
Number of 
Obs. 
  
17606 
F(22, 17639)   141.93 F(22, 17583)   139.13 
Prob>F   0.000* Prob>F   0.000* 
R-squared   0.147 
Anderson 
stats: χ2 (2) 4402.454 
 
0.000* 
Root MSE   23.764 
Sargan stats: 
χ2 (1) 0.652 
 
0.4195* 
a. Informal Sales is measured as a proportion of total sales. b. See Appendix Table A1 for meaning of the variable 
names. c. *, ** and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. d. icrg_IV implies that icrg is 
instrumented by Freedom of Press and CO2 emission. 
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Table 2: Joint Estimates of Informal Sales and Bribe Demand (with country level 
corruption perception indicators excluded) 
Informal Salesa Bribe demanda 
Variablesb Coefficientc 
Robust 
SE P>|z| Variablesb Coefficientc 
Robust 
SE P>|z| 
Bribe demand 2.95* 0.42 0.000 informal_sales 0.00* 0.00 0.000 
size -1.55* 0.27 0.000 size -0.02* 0.00 0.000 
firmage -0.08* 0.01 0.000 firmage 0.00* 0.00 0.000 
conf_justice -0.83* 0.13 0.000 conf_justice -0.02* 0.00 0.000 
DEffGovt 3.69* 0.74 0.000 DEffGovt -0.07* 0.01 0.000 
BClegalsyst 0.42** 0.20 0.033 BClegalsyst -0.01*** 0.00 0.091 
BCanticomp 1.29* 0.17 0.000 BCanticomp 0.01* 0.00 0.001 
BCcrime -1.07* 0.19 0.000 BCcrime -0.01** 0.00 0.032 
BCcorrupt 2.46* 0.20 0.000 BCcorrupt 0.04* 0.00 0.000 
BCinstable 1.10* 0.19 0.000 BCinstable -0.01** 0.00 0.014 
BCpolicy -0.69* 0.20 0.000 BCpolicy 0.00 0.00 0.454 
BClic 0.15 0.18 0.410 BClic 0.03* 0.00 0.000 
BClabregu 0.53* 0.18 0.004 BClabregu 0.01* 0.00 0.006 
income 1.16* 0.36 0.001 income 0.04* 0.01 0.000 
Dexport 0.64 0.47 0.174 Dexport -0.01 0.01 0.504 
Dforeign -4.98* 0.59 0.000 Dforeign 0.03* 0.01 0.001 
year 0.52* 0.19 0.006 year -0.04* 0.00 0.000 
npl 0.21* 0.05 0.000     
gini 0.47* 0.03 0.000 gini -0.01* 0.00 0.000 
lgnp -3.69* 0.65 0.000 lgnp 0.09* 0.02 0.000 
    rol -0.15* 0.01 0.000 
    hdi -1.12* 0.18 0.000 
    unempl 0.00*** 0.00 0.064 
    literacy -0.02* 0.00 0.000 
    lpop -0.03* 0.00 0.000 
constant -1013.53* 382.12 0.008 constant 77.56* 6.56 0.000 
Number of Obs.   17904 
Number of 
Obs.   17904 
Wald test of significance:  
χ2 (20) 2632.51 
Wald test of significance:  
χ2 (24) 4713.72 
Prob > χ2   0.000* Prob > χ2   0.000* 
R2   0.126 R2   0.207 
Root MSE   24.01 Root MSE   0.418 
a. Informal Sales is measured as a proportion of total sales. Bribe demand is measured by the variable that takes a 
value of 1 if asked for a bribe, 0 otherwise. b. See Appendix Table A1 for meaning of the variable names.  
c. *, ** and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 3: Joint Estimates of Informal Sales and Bribe demand (with country level 
corruption perception indicators, icrg and cpi included) 
Informal Salesa Bribe demanda 
Variablesb Coefficientc 
Robust 
SE P>|z| Variablesb Coefficientc 
Robust 
SE P>|z| 
Bribe demand -0.66 0.52 0.204 informal_sales 0.00* 0.00 0.002 
icrg 3.60* 0.42 0.000 cpi 0.01 0.01 0.131 
size -0.41 0.34 0.232 size -0.01*** 0.01 0.094 
firmage -0.08* 0.01 0.000 firmage 0.00* 0.00 0.000 
conf_justice -0.84* 0.17 0.000 conf_justice -0.02* 0.00 0.000 
DEffGovt 3.21* 1.00 0.001 DEffGovt -0.02 0.02 0.184 
BClegalsyst 0.61** 0.26 0.018 BClegalsyst 0.00 0.00 0.622 
BCanticomp 1.62* 0.22 0.000 BCanticomp 0.02* 0.00 0.000 
BCcrime -0.81* 0.25 0.001 BCcrime -0.01 0.00 0.169 
BCcorrupt 1.75* 0.26 0.000 BCcorrupt 0.05* 0.00 0.000 
BCinstable 0.95* 0.24 0.000 BCinstable 0.00 0.00 0.743 
BCpolicy -1.27* 0.25 0.000 BCpolicy 0.00 0.00 0.702 
BClic 0.04 0.23 0.865 BClic 0.03* 0.00 0.000 
BClabregu 0.36 0.23 0.123 BClabregu 0.02* 0.00 0.000 
income -1.78* 0.48 0.000 income 0.17* 0.01 0.000 
Dexport 0.83 0.59 0.161 Dexport -0.01 0.01 0.177 
Dforeign -4.53* 0.77 0.000 Dforeign 0.00 0.01 0.928 
year 15.00* 0.71 0.000 year -0.06* 0.01 0.000 
npl 2.49* 0.11 0.000     
gini 1.68* 0.06 0.000 gini 0.00* 0.00 0.000 
lgnp 2.65** 1.07 0.013 lgnp 0.22* 0.03 0.000 
    rol -0.24* 0.03 0.000 
    hdi -3.02* 0.40 0.000 
    unempl 0.01* 0.00 0.000 
    literacy -0.05* 0.00 0.000 
    lpop -0.05* 0.00 0.000 
constant -30154.39* 1424.96 0.000 constant 121.50* 26.58 0.000 
Number of 
Obs.   10883 
Number of 
Obs.   10883 
Wald test of significance: 
χ2 (21) 3030.20 
Wald test of significance:  
χ2 (25)  2450.56 
Prob > χ2   0.000* Prob > χ2   0.000* 
R2   0.218 R2   0.184 
Root MSE   23.110 Root MSE   0.415 
a. Informal Sales is measured as a proportion of total sales. Bribe demand is measured by the variable that takes a 
value of 1 if asked for a bribe, 0 otherwise. b. See Appendix Table A1 for meaning of the variable names.  
c. *, ** and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table A1: Appendix – Variable Definitions and Data Sources. 
WBES 
Variables Firm characteristics Definition (Source: A)  
Bribe demand Bribe Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is asked for bribe, 0 otherwise  
informal_sales Informal Share in Sales Share of sales not declared, in percentage 
size Firm size dummies Small if 5-50 employees; medium if 51-500 employees; large if >500 employees 
firmage Age of Firm Age of Firm at the survey year 
conf_justice Confidence in Judicial System 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "tend to agree", 
"mostly agree", or "fully agree" to the question: Confident judicial 
system will uphold property rights?, 0 otherwise  
DEffGovt 
Efficiency of 
government in 
delivering services 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "somewhat 
efficient", "efficient" or "very efficient" to the question: How would 
you generally rate the efficiency of central and local government in 
delivering services, 0 otherwise  
BClegalsyst 
Business 
constraint: legal 
system/conflict 
resolution 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", 
"moderate", "major" or "very severe" to the question: How 
problematic is functioning of the judiciary for the operation and 
growth of your business, 0 otherwise  
BCanticomp 
Business 
constraint:  anti-
competitive/inform
al practices 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", 
"moderate", "major" or "very severe" to the question: How 
problematic is anti-competitive/informal practices for the operation 
and growth of your business, 0 otherwise  
BCcrime 
Business 
constraint: crime, 
theft, disorder 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", 
"moderate", "major" or "very severe" to the question: How 
problematic is crime, theft, disorder for the operation and growth of 
your business, 0 otherwise  
BCcorrupt 
Business 
constraint: 
corruption 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", 
"moderate", "major" or "very severe" to the question: How 
problematic is corruption for the operation and growth of your 
business, 0 otherwise  
BCinstable 
Business 
constraint: 
macroeconomic 
instability  (infl., 
exch. rate) 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", 
"moderate", "major" or "very severe" to the question: How 
problematic is macroeconomic instability for the operation and 
growth of your business, 0 otherwise  
BCpolicy 
Business 
constraint: 
economic & 
regulatory policy 
t i t
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", 
"moderate", "major" or "very severe" to the question: How 
problematic is economic & regulatory policy uncertainty for the 
operation and growth of your business, 0 otherwise  
BClic 
Business 
constraint: 
licensing  and 
operating permits 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", 
"moderate", "major" or "very severe" to the question: How 
problematic is licensing  and operating permits for the operation and 
growth of your business, 0 otherwise  
BClabregu 
Business 
constraint: labour 
regulations 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", 
"moderate", "major" or "very severe" to the question: How 
problematic is labour regulations for the operation and growth of 
your business, 0 otherwise  
income Income grouping for survey year 
Firm Income = 1 if "low"; =2 if "lower-middle"; = 3 if "upper-
middle" = 4 if "high"; = 5 if "high oecd" 
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Dexport Exporter Dummy variable (=1) if the firm is an exporter, 0 otherwise  
Table A1: Continued 
Dforeign  Foreign Dummy variable (=1) if the firm is of foreign ownership, 0 otherwise 
time Year of Survey Takes the value 0 in base year 2002 and maximum value is 4 in 2006 
Country 
Variables 
Country 
characteristics  Definition (Source) 
lpop Population  Population of the country in millions in the survey year, expressed in Log (B)  
unemployment Unemployment rate  Unemployment, total (% of total labour force) (B) 
rol Rule of law Synthetic index, rescaled adding 4 points to the index to avoid negative values where a higher indicator denotes a higher quality rule of law (F) 
hdi Human Development Index 
Human Development Indicator from UNDP, where higher values denote 
higher development (C) 
press Freedom of Press 
Index of restrictions on media content 1) laws and regulations (0-15 points, 
2) political pressures and controls (0-15 points), 3 repressive actions (e.g. 
killing journalists, censorship) (0-5 points). More point means less freedom. 
Rated: 1 (free)  to 3 (unfree) (Freedom House: Press Freedom Survey) (H) 
emission CO2 Emission Per capita CO2 Emission (B) 
lgnp Gross National Income Log of Gross National Income per capita, PPP, (current international $) (B) 
literacy Literacy rate Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) of the country (B) 
npl Non Performing Loans Bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans (%) (B) 
gini Inequality, GINI coefficient GINI coefficient (B) 
cpi Corruption Perception Index Takes value of 0 (highly clean) to 10 (highly corrupt) (D) 
icrg International Country Risk Guide Takes value of 0 (least risky) to 6 (highly risky) (E) 
Source:     
A WBES http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/ 
B WDI www.worldbank.org/data 
C HDR, UNDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/ 
D  CPI http://www.transparency.org/ 
E ICRG International Country Risk Guide, Report by The PRS Group, Inc. (1984-2008)
F World Governance Indicators 96-07 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
G Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landlocked 
H World Database of Happiness http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/statnat/statnat_fp.htm 
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Table A2: Appendix- Countries, Years and Number of firms.   
Country Year Number of firms 
Bulgaria 2002 212 
China 2002 811 
Czech Republic 2002 232 
Estonia 2002 136 
Croatia 2002 140 
Hungary 2002 214 
Kazakhstan 2002 215 
Lithuania 2002 176 
Latvia 2002 158 
Moldova 2002 167 
Peru 2002 444 
Poland 2002 461 
Romania 2002 232 
Slovenia 2002 151 
Russia 2002 427 
Turkey 2002 490 
Ukraine 2002 427 
Brazil 2003 1514 
Guatemala 2003 451 
Honduras 2003 361 
Indonesia 2003 713 
Moldova 2003 97 
Nicaragua 2003 371 
Philippines 2003 598 
Poland 2003 101 
El Salvador 2003 424 
Uganda 2003 189 
South Africa 2003 568 
Bulgaria 2004 356 
Chile 2004 895 
Egypt 2004 961 
Morocco 2004 834 
Sri Lanka 2004 355 
Turkey 2004 525 
Azarbaijan 2005 349 
Bulgaria 2005 290 
Costa Rica 2005 287 
Czech Republic 2005 333 
Germany 2005 1192 
Dominican Republic 2005 182 
Estonia 2005 170 
Spain 2005 600 
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Georgia 2005 164 
Table A2: Continued   
Greece 2005 502 
Croatia 2005 210 
Hungary 2005 592 
Ireland 2005 490 
Jamaica 2005 73 
Kazakhstan 2005 568 
Lithuania 2005 172 
Latvia 2005 194 
Mauritius 2005 171 
Moldova 2005 321 
Macedonia 2005 182 
Poland 2005 969 
Portugal 2005 502 
Romania 2005 577 
Slovenia 2005 205 
Slovakia 2005 191 
Turkey 2005 1120 
Ukraine 2005 573 
Argentina 2006 947 
El Salvador 2006 554 
   
Total  27086 
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